Ties

36 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2019

See all articles by Federico Revelli

Federico Revelli

University of Turin

Tsung-Sheng Tsai

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

This paper investigates whether the rare occurrence of a local election ending in a tie or being decided by a single vote generates informational spill-overs on nearby localities' subsequent elections. First, based on the pivotal-voter theory, we develop a model of costly instrumental voting in sequential elections with private information, where voters update their beliefs regarding the distribution of political preferences and the probability of their vote being decisive upon observing the outcomes in earlier elections, and decide whether to turn out to vote accordingly. Next, by exploiting over a hundred exact ties or one-vote-difference results in Italian mayoral elections during the past two decades and the quasi-experimental conditions created by the staggered municipal electoral calendar, we test the model's empirical predictions and find a substantial impact on voter turnout rates of exposure for geographical reasons to spill-overs from the localities experiencing those bizarre electoral outcomes.

Keywords: tied elections, voter turnout, information spill-over, salience

JEL Classification: D720, H710

Suggested Citation

Revelli, Federico and Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, Ties (2019). CESifo Working Paper No. 7786, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3434842

Federico Revelli (Contact Author)

University of Turin ( email )

Via Po 53
Facolta di Scienze Politiche
10124 Torino
Italy

Tsung-Sheng Tsai

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics ( email )

No. 1, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Rd.
Taipei, 10617
Taiwan

HOME PAGE: http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~tstsai

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