The Chicago School’s Limited Influence on International Antitrust

29 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2019 Last revised: 9 Oct 2020

See all articles by Anu Bradford

Anu Bradford

Columbia University - Law School

Adam Chilton

University of Chicago - Law School

Filippo Lancieri

Georgetown University Law Center; ETH Zurich Center For Law and Economics; Stigler Center

Date Written: December 12, 2019

Abstract

Beginning in the 1950s, a group of scholars primarily associated with the University of Chicago began to challenge many of the fundamental tenants of antitrust law. This movement, which became known as the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, profoundly altered the course of American antitrust scholarship, regulation, and enforcement. What is not known, however, is the degree to which Chicago School ideas influenced the antitrust regimes of other countries. By leveraging new datasets on antitrust laws and enforcement around the world, we empirically explore whether ideas embraced by the Chicago School diffused internationally. Our analysis illustrates that many ideas explicitly rejected by the Chicago School—such as using antitrust law to promote goals beyond efficiency or regulate unilateral conduct—are common features of antitrust regimes in other countries. We also provide suggestive evidence that the influence of the antitrust revolution launched by the Chicago School has been more limited outside of the United States.

Keywords: Antitrust, Competition Law, Comparative Law, Chicago School

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Bradford, Anu and Chilton, Adam and Lancieri, Filippo, The Chicago School’s Limited Influence on International Antitrust (December 12, 2019). University of Chicago Law Review 87(2), 297-330, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435097

Anu Bradford

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10009

Adam Chilton (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.adamchilton.org

Filippo Lancieri

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

ETH Zurich Center For Law and Economics ( email )

ETH-Zentrum SEW E 26
CH-8092 Zurich, Zurich 8006
Switzerland

Stigler Center ( email )

Walker Hall
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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