Decisions on Extending Group Membership: Evidence from a Public Good Experiment

36 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2019

See all articles by Christian Grund

Christian Grund

RWTH Aachen University - School of Economics and Business Administration; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Christine Harbring

University of Cologne; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Kirsten Thommes

RWTH Aachen University

Katja Tilkes

RWTH Aachen University

Abstract

We experimentally analyze whether the opportunity to receive a permanent contract motivates temporary group members in a public good setting and how this affects the other group members. We compare an exogenous and an endogenous decision mechanism to extend the temporary agent's group membership. The exogenous mechanism to extend the contract is modeled by a random draw. In the endogenous setting, one other group member decides about the temporary agent's future group membership. Our results reveal that both — the decision to extend a contract and the decision mechanism itself — affect not only the temporary group member's effort but also the efforts of the permanent group members and, ultimately, also cooperation within the group after the decision has been made.

Keywords: cooperation, experiments, groups, public good games, teams, temporary employment

JEL Classification: C9, M5

Suggested Citation

Grund, Christian and Harbring, Christine and Thommes, Kirsten and Tilkes, Katja, Decisions on Extending Group Membership: Evidence from a Public Good Experiment. IZA Discussion Paper No. 12513. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435388

Christian Grund (Contact Author)

RWTH Aachen University - School of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Aachen
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Christine Harbring

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany
+ 49 (0) 221 / 470 - 7955 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Kirsten Thommes

RWTH Aachen University ( email )

Templergraben 55
52056 Aachen, 52056
Germany

Katja Tilkes

RWTH Aachen University

Templergraben 55
52056 Aachen, 52056
Germany

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