Private deposit insurance, deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard
59 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2019 Last revised: 30 Mar 2022
We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net.
Keywords: private deposit insurance, deposit flows, lending, financial crisis
JEL Classification: G21, G28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation