Political Corruption and Capture of the Minority

Giannoccolo P., Lisciandra M. (2019). Political Corruption and Capture of the Minority. Economics & Politics, Early View. DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12137.

Posted: 15 Aug 2019

See all articles by Maurizio Lisciandra

Maurizio Lisciandra

University of Messina - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 1, 2019

Abstract

This article presents a model of political corruption in which a briber can choose either to bribe only the incumbent party or to capture also the opposition party to sterilize its monitoring role. The analysis also explores interparty collusion, media independence, and political contestability. The model suggests that policies aiming to strengthen the role of minorities can produce ambiguous effects as they may induce bribers’ avoidance behavior. Reputational sanctions appear to be less effective than criminal ones, although political contestability increases their deterrence effect. Paradoxically, harsh criminal sanctions may induce tacit collusion because minorities highly regard their outcomes once in power.

Keywords: anti‐corruption, bribing, hierarchies, political parties, voters

JEL Classification: D72, D73, K42

Suggested Citation

Lisciandra, Maurizio, Political Corruption and Capture of the Minority (August 1, 2019). Giannoccolo P., Lisciandra M. (2019). Political Corruption and Capture of the Minority. Economics & Politics, Early View. DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12137., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3436043

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