Fascism and Monopoly

43 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2019

See all articles by Daniel A. Crane

Daniel A. Crane

University of Michigan Law School

Date Written: August 1, 2019


The recent revival of political interest in antitrust has resurfaced a longstanding debate about the role of industrial concentration and monopoly in enabling Hitler’s rise to power and the Third Reich’s wars of aggression. Proponents of stronger antitrust enforcement argue that monopolies and cartels brought the Nazis to power and warn that rising concentration in the American economy could similarly threaten democracy. Skeptics demur, observing that German big business largely opposed Hitler during the crucial years of his ascent. Drawing on business histories and archival material from the U.S. Office of Military Government’s Decartelization Unit, this Article assesses the historical record on the role of industrial concentration in facilitating Nazism. It finds compelling evidence that, while German big business principally did not support Hitler before he won the Chancellorship in 1933, the extreme concentration of market power during the Weimar period enabled Hitler to seize and consolidate totalitarian power through a variety of mechanisms. Hence, the German experience with Nazism lends support to the idea that extreme concentration of economic power enables extreme concentration of political power. However, most of the conduct that created the radical economic concentration of the Weimar period would be unlawful under contemporary antitrust principles, which casts doubt on claims that a significant shift in antitrust enforcement is necessary to forestall anti-democratic forces.

Keywords: antitrust, democracy

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Crane, Daniel A., Fascism and Monopoly (August 1, 2019). Michigan Law Review, Vol. 119, Forthcoming , U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 644, U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 19-008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3436231

Daniel A. Crane (Contact Author)

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-615-2622 (Phone)

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