Modelling Transactions with Ultimatum Games: An Experiment on Certification

U of Oxford Economics Discussion Paper No. 87

27 Pages Posted: 5 Dec 2002

See all articles by Gerardo A. Guerra

Gerardo A. Guerra

University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 2002

Abstract

Ultimatum games have been extensively used in experimental studies. By studying the consequences that restrictions shared by ultimatum games have in subject's behaviour, this paper argues that some results are falsified by design constraints. This paper also presents a taxonomy of certification, and provides experimental evidence supporting the commonly observed use of rankings in certificates, as well as the restriction of awareness by certifiers to increase revenue. Regulatory implications are discussed.

Keywords: Ultimatum, Bargaining, Experiments, Certification, Asymmetric Information

JEL Classification: C72, C78, C90, D18, D63, D82, L15, L86

Suggested Citation

Guerra, Gerardo A., Modelling Transactions with Ultimatum Games: An Experiment on Certification (February 2002). U of Oxford Economics Discussion Paper No. 87, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=343660 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.343660

Gerardo A. Guerra (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )

BREB Unit
Manor Road Building, Manor Road
Oxford OX1 3UQ
United Kingdom

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