The Political Economy of Enforcer Liability for Wrongful Police Stops

Journal of Public Economic Theory (Forthcoming)

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 19-23

22 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2019 Last revised: 30 Nov 2020

See all articles by Tim Friehe

Tim Friehe

University of Marburg

Murat C. Mungan

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: August 15, 2019

Abstract

This article questions whether excessive policing practices can persist in an environment where law enforcement policies are subject to political pressures. Specifically, it considers a setting where the police decide whether to conduct stops based on the suspiciousness of a person's behavior and the potential liability for conducting a wrongful stop. We establish that the liability level that results in a voting equilibrium is smaller than optimal, and, consequently, that excessive policing practices emerge in equilibrium.

Keywords: Crime; Police Stops; Political Economy; Liability

JEL Classification: K42, P48

Suggested Citation

Friehe, Tim and Mungan, Murat C., The Political Economy of Enforcer Liability for Wrongful Police Stops (August 15, 2019). Journal of Public Economic Theory (Forthcoming), George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 19-23, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3438024 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3438024

Tim Friehe

University of Marburg ( email )

Universitätsstrasse 24
D-35032 Marburg, D-35032
Germany

Murat C. Mungan (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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