How the First Forty Years of Circuit Precedent Got Title VII's Sex Discrimination Provision Wrong

98 Texas Law Review Online 83 (2019)

48 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2019 Last revised: 6 Nov 2019

Date Written: November 4, 2019

Abstract

The Supreme Court will soon decide whether, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is discrimination “because of sex” to fire an employee because of their sexual orientation or transgender identity. There’s a simple textual argument that it is: An employer cannot take action on the basis of an employee’s sexual orientation or transgender identity without considering the employee’s sex. But while this argument is simple, it was not one that federal courts adopted until recently. This has caused some judges to object that the simple argument must be inconsistent with the original meaning of Title VII. In the words of one Fifth Circuit judge, “If the first forty years of uniform circuit precedent nationwide somehow got the original understanding of Title VII wrong, no one has explained how.”

This Essay explains how the first forty years of circuit precedent got Title VII wrong. It demonstrates that, rather than relying on the statutory text, early appellate decisions relied on their era’s misunderstanding of LGBTQ identities as pathological, unnatural, and deviant. The errors of the early cases persisted as a result of stare decisis, until the old doctrine was rendered indefensible by changing social attitudes, the rise of textualism, and the Supreme Court’s recognition that Title VII forbids an employer from insisting that men or women conform to sex stereotypes. This account has important implications for the pending cases, as well as for social movements that seek to disable prejudice.

Keywords: LGBT, Sexual Orientation, Transgender, Sex Stereotypes, Title VII, Employment Discrimination, Sex Discrimination

Suggested Citation

Clarke, Jessica, How the First Forty Years of Circuit Precedent Got Title VII's Sex Discrimination Provision Wrong (November 4, 2019). 98 Texas Law Review Online 83 (2019), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3438038

Jessica Clarke (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

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