Corporate Governance, Bankruptcy Waivers and Consolidation in Bankruptcy

36 Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal __ (Forthcoming)

UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 19-08

48 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2019

See all articles by Daniel J. Bussel

Daniel J. Bussel

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Date Written: August 16, 2019

Abstract

Corporate law formalities that impede effective bankruptcy relief are properly overridden in bankruptcy. Those formalities generally count for little outside bankruptcy and should not hamstring a bankruptcy court’s ability to afford effective relief consistent with the underlying policies of the Code. Nevertheless, recent scholarship and caselaw in bankruptcy, reflecting a contract uber alles zeitgeist has given too much credence to both entity partitions that blink the reality of how firms actually operate and contractual barriers to voluntary bankruptcy relief baked into corporate charters. Bankruptcy law should refocus on honoring substance over form. In doing so, corporate formalities will properly yield to underlying substantive bankruptcy policy. The limited role of corporate formalities in the event of insolvency should be factored into market expectations surrounding asset securitization, including the frailty of both entity partitions within corporate groups and bargained-for restrictions on entities’ access to bankruptcy relief.

Keywords: bankruptcy law, corporate law, bankruptcy code, bankruptcy relief, corporate governance

Suggested Citation

Bussel, Daniel J., Corporate Governance, Bankruptcy Waivers and Consolidation in Bankruptcy (August 16, 2019). 36 Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal __ (Forthcoming); UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 19-08. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3438493

Daniel J. Bussel (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-206-7977 (Phone)
310-825-6023 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
21
Abstract Views
119
PlumX Metrics