Detrimental Collaborations in Creative Work: Evidence from Economics

37 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2019 Last revised: 4 Jan 2020

See all articles by Keyvan Vakili

Keyvan Vakili

London Business School

Florenta Teodoridis

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Michaël Bikard

INSEAD

Date Written: December 15, 2019

Abstract

Prior research on collaboration and creativity has mostly assumed that individuals choose to collaborate because collaboration positively contributes to output quality. In this paper, we argue that collaboration conceals individual contributions, and that the presence of a collaboration credit premium—when the sum of fractional credits allocated to each collaborator exceeds 100%—might motivate individuals to collaborate even when their collaboration hurts output quality. We test our argument on a sample of economists in academia. To estimate the causal effect of collaboration, we take advantage of the norm of alphabetical ordering of authors on scientific articles published in economics journals. This norm means that economists whose family name begins with a letter from the beginning of the alphabet receive systematically more credit for collaborative work than economists whose family name begins with a letter from the end of the alphabet. Using this systematic difference as an instrument for collaborative behavior, we show that economists sometimes choose to collaborate even in cases where this choice decreases output quality. Collaboration can therefore create a misalignment between the incentives of creative workers and the prospects of the project.

Keywords: Collaboration, Credit Allocation, Creativity, Credit Premium, Innovation

Suggested Citation

Vakili, Keyvan and Teodoridis, Florenta and Bikard, Michaël A., Detrimental Collaborations in Creative Work: Evidence from Economics (December 15, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3438932 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3438932

Keyvan Vakili (Contact Author)

London Business School ( email )

Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

Florenta Teodoridis

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Michaël A. Bikard

INSEAD ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
Fontainebleau, 77300
France

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