Federal Forum Provisions and the Internal Affairs Doctrine

52 Pages Posted: 25 Aug 2019 Last revised: 27 Aug 2020

See all articles by Dhruv Aggarwal

Dhruv Aggarwal

Yale University, School of Management

Albert H. Choi

University of Michigan Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Ofer Eldar

Duke University - School of Law and Fuqua School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

Date Written: August 26, 2020

Abstract

A key question at the intersection of state and federal law is whether corporations can use their charters or bylaws to restrict securities litigation to federal court. In December 2018, the Delaware Chancery Court answered this question in the negative in the landmark decision Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg. The court invalidated “federal forum provisions” (“FFPs”) that allow companies to select federal district courts as the exclusive venue for claims brought under the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). The decision held that the internal affairs doctrine, which is the bedrock of U.S. corporate law, does not permit charter and bylaw provisions that restrict rights under federal law. In March 2020, the Delaware Supreme Court overturned the Chancery’s decision in Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, holding, among others, that in addition to “internal” affairs, charters and bylaws can regulate “intra-corporate” affairs, including choosing the forum for Securities Act claims.

This Article presents the first empirical analysis of federal forum provisions. Using a hand-collected data set, we examine the patterns of adoption of such provisions and the characteristics of adopting firms. We show that adoption rates are higher for firms with characteristics, such as belonging to a particular industry, that make them more vulnerable to claims under the 1933 Act. We also show that adoption rates substantially increased after the Supreme Court case Cyan Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, which validated concurrent jurisdiction for both federal and state courts for 1933 Act claims. We also find that the firms that adopt FFPs at the initial public offering (“IPO”) stage tend to share characteristics that have been associated with relatively good corporate governance. To assess the impact of the Sciabacucchi decision, we also conduct an event study. We find that the decision is associated with a large negative stock price effect for companies that had FFPs in their charters or bylaws. The effect is robust even for firms that had better governance features, that underpriced their stock at the IPOs, and whose stock price traded at or above the IPO price prior to the Sciabacucchi decision.

In light of the empirical findings suggesting that federal forum provisions may serve shareholders’ interests by mitigating excessive 1933 Act litigation, we consider alternative legal theories for validating federal forum provisions in corporate charters and bylaws. We suggest two possible approaches: (1) allowing corporate charters and bylaws to address matters that are technically external but deal with the “affairs” of the corporation; and (2) adopting a more “flexible” internal affairs doctrine that could view 1933 Act claims as being “internal” to a corporation’s affairs. The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision can be viewed as being more consistent with the first, rather than the second, approach. We examine the possible implications of adopting either approach, particularly with respect to the existing Delaware statute on exclusive forum provisions and to mandatory arbitration provisions.

Keywords: corporate law, forum selection, securities litigation, internal affairs, Delaware, private ordering

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Aggarwal, Dhruv and Choi, Albert H. and Eldar, Ofer, Federal Forum Provisions and the Internal Affairs Doctrine (August 26, 2020). 10 Harvard Business Law Review 383 (2020), U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 19-009, U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 646, Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2019-58, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439078 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3439078

Dhruv Aggarwal

Yale University, School of Management ( email )

New Haven, CT
United States

Albert H. Choi

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.umich.edu/FacultyBio/Pages/FacultyBio.aspx?FacID=alchoi

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://ecgi.global/users/albert-h-choi

Ofer Eldar (Contact Author)

Duke University - School of Law and Fuqua School of Business ( email )

210 Science Dr
Durham, NC 27708-9985
United States
27705 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative ( email )

215 Morris St., Suite 300
Durham, NC 27701
United States

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