Symmetric Ignorance: The Cost of Anonymous Lemons

European Financial Managment

12 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2019 Last revised: 11 Dec 2020

See all articles by Amar Bhide

Amar Bhide

Harvard University - Business School (HBS)

Date Written: August 18, 2019

Abstract

Rules that restrict information required in negotiated private transactions have spurred a vast increase in the scope of anonymous financial markets, particularly in the US. The subtle costs of the information restricting rules raise questions about the social value of “completing” anonymous markets that would not naturally survive and did not historically exist.

Keywords: information asymmetry, securities markets, securitization, regulation, liquidity

JEL Classification: G10, G18, G28, G38, K22, N2

Suggested Citation

Bhide, Amar, Symmetric Ignorance: The Cost of Anonymous Lemons (August 18, 2019). European Financial Managment, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439105 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3439105

Amar Bhide (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

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