Agency Conflicts, Macroeconomic Risk, and Asset Prices

51 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2019 Last revised: 14 Oct 2019

See all articles by Adelphe Ekponon

Adelphe Ekponon

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School

Date Written: August 21, 2019

Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic corporate finance model with macroeconomic risk to study the effect of conflicts between insiders and outside investors on the cost of equity. Agency conflicts, resulting from insiders’ willingness to favor their interests at the expense of the firm are costly and reduce firms’ profit. They are also exposed to the business cycle, leading to time-varying agency costs. To test the model, I use top measures of agency conflicts and merge them with stock returns. The difference in the average value of these indexes in bad compared to good times is positively correlated to the cost of equity, even after controlling for preeminent market factors. Hence, firms with better governance in bad times have a lower cost of equity. Data are from 1990 to 2006.

Keywords: Asset Pricing, Corporate Governance, Investors Protection

JEL Classification: G12, G32, G32

Suggested Citation

Ekponon, Adelphe, Agency Conflicts, Macroeconomic Risk, and Asset Prices (August 21, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3440168 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3440168

Adelphe Ekponon (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School ( email )

Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/adelpheekponon/

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