Learning About Deception From Lawyers

93 Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Issue 1, 2019, Pages 69–90.

UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 19-25

32 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2019

See all articles by Seana Shiffrin

Seana Shiffrin

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Date Written: August 20, 2019

Abstract

Legal domains concerned with deception often recognize and regulate cases of negligent deception. The philosophical discussion of deception should follow suit, shifting from an exclusive focus on deception-as-wrongful-manipulation to a broader panorama that includes negligent deception and contemplates cases in which negligent deception may be wrong even when intentional deception about the same information may be permissible. Interesting philosophical questions then arise about what distinguishes negligent deception from mere misunderstandings and mistakes. Those questions require further thought about how relationships involve epistemic cooperation and interdependence, and when such relationships generate responsibility for others’ mental contents.

Keywords: negligent deception, deception through communication

Suggested Citation

Shiffrin, Seana, Learning About Deception From Lawyers (August 20, 2019). 93 Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Issue 1, 2019, Pages 69–90.; UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 19-25. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3440200

Seana Shiffrin (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States

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