Lumps in Antitrust Law

10 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2019 Last revised: 18 Oct 2019

See all articles by Sean Sullivan

Sean Sullivan

University of Iowa College of Law

Date Written: October 15, 2019

Abstract

This paper uses the framework of aggregation and separation that Lee Fennell develops in Slices and Lumps to discuss two fundamental questions of antitrust policy. First, how far does the lumpiness of trading partners dictate the limits of antitrust policy? Second, what does antitrust miss under the common practice of lumping price, consumer welfare, and allocative efficiency together? Discussion of these questions is clarified and sharpened by the vocabulary of Fennell’s framework.

Keywords: Antitrust, Concentration, Consumer Welfare, Efficiency

JEL Classification: K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Sullivan, Sean, Lumps in Antitrust Law (October 15, 2019). U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2019-20. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3440437 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3440437

Sean Sullivan (Contact Author)

University of Iowa College of Law ( email )

Melrose and Byington
Iowa City, IA 52242
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sean-p-sullivan.com

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