Lumps in Antitrust Law

11 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2019 Last revised: 24 Nov 2019

See all articles by Sean Sullivan

Sean Sullivan

University of Iowa College of Law

Date Written: November 19, 2019


This paper uses the framework of aggregation and separation that Lee Fennell develops in Slices and Lumps to discuss two fundamental questions of antitrust policy. First, how far does the lumpiness of trading partners dictate the limits of antitrust policy? Second, what does antitrust miss under the common practice of lumping price, consumer welfare, and allocative efficiency together? Discussion of these questions is clarified and sharpened by the vocabulary of Fennell’s framework.

Keywords: Antitrust, Concentration, Consumer Welfare, Efficiency

JEL Classification: K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Sullivan, Sean, Lumps in Antitrust Law (November 19, 2019). U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2019-20, Available at SSRN: or

Sean Sullivan (Contact Author)

University of Iowa College of Law ( email )

Melrose and Byington
Iowa City, IA 52242
United States


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