Download This PaperLumps in Antitrust Law
9 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2019 Last revised: 17 Sep 2019
Date Written: August 23, 2019
Abstract
This paper uses the framework of aggregation and separation that Lee Fennell develops in Slices and Lumps to discuss two fundamental questions of antitrust policy. First, how far does the lumpiness of trading partners dictate the limits of antitrust policy? Second, what does antitrust miss under the common practice of lumping price, consumer welfare, and allocative efficiency together? Discussion of these questions is clarified and sharpened by the vocabulary of Fennell’s framework.
Keywords: Antitrust, Concentration, Consumer Welfare, Efficiency
JEL Classification: K21, L40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Sullivan, Sean, Lumps in Antitrust Law (August 23, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3440437 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3440437
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