Comparing Theories of One-Shot Play Out of Treatment

24 Pages Posted: 24 Aug 2019 Last revised: 21 Dec 2021

See all articles by Philipp Külpmann

Philipp Külpmann

University of Vienna - Vienna Center for Experimental Economics

Christoph Kuzmics

University of Graz - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 17, 2021

Abstract

We collected data on one-shot play for a representative selection of two-player two- and three-strategy games with unique and completely mixed strategy predictions and propose a new method to compare theories of one-shot play ``out of treatment'' that allows a direct likelihood comparison: Competing theories are calibrated with pre-existing data using different games and subjects. Most theories in most treatments have predictive power. No theory is uniformly best. Considering risk aversion significantly improves predictive power. Nash equilibrium with risk aversion is among the best predictors of play in four of six treatment groups: the exceptions are the behavior of individuals in the asymmetric own-payoff player positions in games of a matching pennies and rock-scissors-paper variety.

Keywords: hawk-dove games, testing theories, one-shot play, risk aversion, Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibria, level-k theory, cognitive hierarchy theory

JEL Classification: C72, C91

Suggested Citation

Külpmann, Philipp and Kuzmics, Christoph, Comparing Theories of One-Shot Play Out of Treatment (December 17, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441675 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3441675

Philipp Külpmann

University of Vienna - Vienna Center for Experimental Economics ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

Christoph Kuzmics (Contact Author)

University of Graz - Department of Economics ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15
RESOWI - F4
Graz, 8010
Austria

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