Comparing Theories of One-Shot Play Out of Treatment

16 Pages Posted: 24 Aug 2019 Last revised: 3 Jun 2020

See all articles by Philipp Külpmann

Philipp Külpmann

University of Vienna - Vienna Center for Experimental Economics

Christoph Kuzmics

University of Graz - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 3, 2020

Abstract

We collect data of one-shot play for a representative selection of two by two games with unique and completely mixed strategy predictions, to compare the predictive power of theories of one-shot play ``out of treatment:'' competing theories are calibrated with pre-existing data using different games and subjects. We find that all theories, except Nash equilibrium, have predictive power; no theory is uniformly best; and taking into account risk aversion significantly improves predictive power. Finally, Nash equilibrium with risk aversion is among the best predictors of play, except for one player position in games of a matching pennies variety.

Keywords: hawk-dove games, testing theories, one-shot play, risk aversion, Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibria, level-k theory, cognitive hierarchy theory

JEL Classification: C72, C91

Suggested Citation

Külpmann, Philipp and Kuzmics, Christoph, Comparing Theories of One-Shot Play Out of Treatment (June 3, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441675 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3441675

Philipp Külpmann

University of Vienna - Vienna Center for Experimental Economics ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

Christoph Kuzmics (Contact Author)

University of Graz - Department of Economics ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15
RESOWI - F4
Graz, 8010
Austria

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