Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2019-062/II

29 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2019

See all articles by Rene van den Brink

Rene van den Brink

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics

Dinko Dimitrov

University of Munich

Agnieszka Rusinowska

CNRS - Paris School of Economics

Date Written: July 24, 2019

Abstract

We study the issue of assigning weights to players that identify winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies. For this, we consider plurality games which are simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said to be precisely supportive if it is possible to assign weights to players in such a way that a coalition being winning in a partition implies that the combined weight of its members is maximal over all coalitions in the partition. A plurality game is decisive if in every partition there is exactly one winning coalition. We show that decisive plurality games with at most four players, majority games with an arbitrary number of players, and almost symmetric decisive plurality games with an arbitrary number of players are precisely supportive. Complete characterizations of a partition's winning coalitions are provided as well.

Keywords: plurality game, plurality voting, precise support, simple game in partition function form, winning coalition

JEL Classification: C71, D62, D72

Suggested Citation

van den Brink, Rene and Dimitrov, Dinko and Rusinowska, Agnieszka, Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies (July 24, 2019). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2019-062/II, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3442795 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3442795

Rene Van den Brink (Contact Author)

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

Dinko Dimitrov

University of Munich ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany

Agnieszka Rusinowska

CNRS - Paris School of Economics ( email )

3, rue Michel-Ange
106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital
Paris cedex 16, 75794
France

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