The Impact of EU Cartel Policy Reforms on the Timing of Settlements in Private Follow-On Damages Disputes: An Empirical Assessment of Cases from 2001 to 2015

39 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2019

See all articles by Hans Wolfgang Friederiszick

Hans Wolfgang Friederiszick

E.CA Economics; ESMT European School of Management and Technology

Linda Gratz

E.CA Economics; Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Munich Graduate School of Economics (MGSE)

Michael Rauber

E.CA Economics

Date Written: August 26, 2019

Abstract

Private cartel damages litigation is on the rise in Europe since early 2000. This development has been initiated by the European courts and was supported by various policy initiatives of the European Commission, which found its culmination in the implementation of the EU Directive on Antitrust Damages end of 2016. This paper explores the impact of this reform process on effective compensation of damaged parties of cartel infringements. For that purpose we analyse all European cartel cases with a decision date between 2001 and 2015, for which we analyse litigation activity and speed. Overall, we find a substantial reduction of the time until first settlement (increase in litigation speed) together with a persisting high share of cases being litigated (high litigation activity). This supports the view that the reform not only increased the claimant’s expectation about the amount of damages being awarded, but also resulted in an alignment in the expectations of claimants and defendants in the final damages amount, i.e. the European Commission succeeded in reaching its objective to clarify and harmonize legal concepts across Europe.

Keywords: cartels, private damages, competition law

Suggested Citation

Friederiszick, Hans Wolfgang and Gratz, Linda and Rauber, Michael, The Impact of EU Cartel Policy Reforms on the Timing of Settlements in Private Follow-On Damages Disputes: An Empirical Assessment of Cases from 2001 to 2015 (August 26, 2019). ESMT Berlin Working Paper No. 19-03, August 2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3443407 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3443407

Hans Wolfgang Friederiszick (Contact Author)

E.CA Economics ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.e-ca.com/our-team/#hans-w-friederiszick

ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://faculty-research.esmt.berlin/person/hans-w-friederiszick/bio

Linda Gratz

E.CA Economics ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany
+49 30 21231 7087 (Phone)
+49 30 21231 7099 (Fax)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Munich Graduate School of Economics (MGSE)

Kaulbachstrasse 45
München, 80539
Germany

Michael Rauber

E.CA Economics ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany

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