Can a Deliberative Mindset Prompt Reduce Investors’ Reliance on Fake News?

41 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2019

See all articles by Stephanie M. Grant

Stephanie M. Grant

University of Washington

Frank D. Hodge

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

Samantha C. Seto

University of Washington, Michael G. Foster School of Business, Students

Date Written: August 28, 2019

Abstract

We examine if prompting investors to be in a deliberative mindset reduces their reliance on financial news when the news is later revealed to be fake. Consistent with theory, results show that investors reduce their reliance on news revealed to be fake, and that this reduction is magnified for investors who were previously prompted to be in a deliberative mindset. Importantly, results also reveal that prompting investors to be in a deliberative mindset does not affect their judgments when the news is later revealed to be true. Our study contributes to research on fake news in the financial markets and has practical implications for investors when evaluating news that may be true or fake.

Keywords: fake news; deliberative mindset; continued influence effect; investor judgments

JEL Classification: G11, M40, M41, C91, D83

Suggested Citation

Grant, Stephanie M. and Hodge, Frank Douglas and Seto, Samantha C, Can a Deliberative Mindset Prompt Reduce Investors’ Reliance on Fake News? (August 28, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3444228 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3444228

Stephanie M. Grant (Contact Author)

University of Washington ( email )

Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States
(206) 543-2904 (Phone)

Frank Douglas Hodge

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )

Paccar Hall 540, Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States
206-616-8598 (Phone)
206-685-9392 (Fax)

Samantha C Seto

University of Washington, Michael G. Foster School of Business, Students ( email )

Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
80
Abstract Views
373
rank
312,364
PlumX Metrics