Changing People's Preferences by the State and the Law

39 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2019 Last revised: 17 Dec 2019

See all articles by Ariel Porat

Ariel Porat

Tel Aviv University; University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: August 29, 2019


In standard economic models, two basic assumptions are made: the first, that actors are rational and, the second, that actors' preferences are a given and exogenously determined. Behavioral economics — followed by behavioral law and economics — has questioned the first assumption. This article challenges the second one, arguing that in many instances, social welfare should be enhanced not by maximizing satisfaction of existing preferences but by changing the preferences themselves. The article identifies seven categories of cases where the traditional objections to intentional preferences change by the state and the law lose force and argues that in these cases, such a change warrants serious consideration. The article then proposes four different modes of intervention in people's preferences, varying in intensity, on the one hand, and the identity of their addressees, on the other, and explains the relative advantages and disadvantages of each form of intervention.

Suggested Citation

Porat, Ariel, Changing People's Preferences by the State and the Law (August 29, 2019). Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 2019, University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 886, U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 722, Available at SSRN:

Ariel Porat (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv, 69978
972-3-6408283 (Phone)
972-3-6407260 (Fax)


University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States


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