Learning Management through Matching: A Field Experiment Using Mechanism Design

46 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2019

See all articles by Girum Abebe

Girum Abebe

University of Westminster - Policy Studies Institute

Marcel Fafchamps

Stanford University

Michael Koelle

University of Oxford

Simon Quinn

University of Oxford

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Abstract

We place young professionals into established firms to shadow middle managers. Using random assignment into program participation, we find positive average effects on wage employment, but no average effect on the likelihood of self-employment. We match individuals to firms using a deferred-acceptance algorithm, and show how this allows us to identify heterogeneous treatment effects by firm and intern characteristics. We find striking heterogeneity in self-employment effects, and show that some assignment mechanisms can substantially outperform random matching in generating employment and income effects. These results demonstrate the potential for matching algorithms to improve the design of field experiments.

Keywords: causal inference, self-employment, management practices, field experiments, propensity score

JEL Classification: J24, J64, D47

Suggested Citation

Abebe, Girum and Fafchamps, Marcel and Koelle, Michael and Quinn, Simon R., Learning Management through Matching: A Field Experiment Using Mechanism Design. IZA Discussion Paper No. 12572, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3445838

Girum Abebe (Contact Author)

University of Westminster - Policy Studies Institute

Marcel Fafchamps

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Michael Koelle

University of Oxford ( email )

Mansfield Road
Oxford, OX1 4AU
United Kingdom

Simon R. Quinn

University of Oxford ( email )

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