Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting

Posted: 4 Sep 2019

See all articles by Gabriel Carroll

Gabriel Carroll

Stanford University - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 2019

Abstract

This review summarizes a nascent body of theoretical research on design of incentives when the environment is not fully known to the designer and offers some general lessons from the work so far. These recent models based on uncertainty and robustness offer an additional set of tools in the toolkit, complementary to more traditional, fully Bayesian modeling approaches, and broaden the range of problems that can be studied. The kinds of insights that such models can offer, and the methodological and technical challenges that they confront, broadly parallel those of traditional approaches.

Suggested Citation

Carroll, Gabriel, Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting (August 2019). Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 139-166, 2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3445882 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025616

Gabriel Carroll (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

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United States

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