Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Posted: 4 Sep 2019

See all articles by Hülya Eraslan

Hülya Eraslan

Rice University

Kirill S. Evdokimov

Rice University - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 2019

Abstract

This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.

Suggested Citation

Eraslan, Hülya and Evdokimov, Kirill S., Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining (August 2019). Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 443-472, 2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3445884 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025633

Kirill S. Evdokimov

Rice University - Department of Economics ( email )

6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
47
PlumX Metrics