Saving Face Through Preference Signaling and Obligation Avoidance

24 Pages Posted: 7 Sep 2019 Last revised: 19 Feb 2020

See all articles by Matthew Chao

Matthew Chao

Williams College

Jonathan Chapman

New York University (NYU) - New York University Abu Dhabi

Date Written: February 16, 2020

Abstract

Many individuals act more selfishly in games when actions are hidden and their image is not at risk. However, some individuals may still desire to publicly signal reciprocity or other socially desired behavior in these contexts. These individuals may view hidden actions not as an opportunity to act selfishly, but rather as an obstacle to signaling preferences or type. Study 1 tests this by implementing a trust game where nature stochastically intervenes and allocates nothing in place of the second-mover’s choice. When nature intervenes, many second-movers choose to sacrifice pay in order to truthfully signal that they attempted to allocate more, and that they therefore tried to reciprocate. Since signaling can be costly, Study 2 tests whether individuals strategically avoid interactions that could necessitate this type of signaling response. Players play two rounds of dictator games of increasing size, swapping roles in between. In treatments that allow it, many players reject allocations from their partner in the first round; they then act more selfishly as the dictator in the subsequent, higher-stakes round. Together, these results emphasize that the need to signal reciprocity or other socially desired behavior can influence how people engage with and respond to others in strategic contexts.

Keywords: Reciprocity, Fairness, Obligation, Social Image, Saving Face

JEL Classification: C70, D91, M31

Suggested Citation

Chao, Matthew and Chapman, Jonathan, Saving Face Through Preference Signaling and Obligation Avoidance (February 16, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3446274 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3446274

Matthew Chao (Contact Author)

Williams College ( email )

Williamstown, MA 01267
United States

Jonathan Chapman

New York University (NYU) - New York University Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

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