Naming and Shaming: Evidence from Event Studies

24 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2019

See all articles by John Armour

John Armour

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Colin Mayer

University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Andrea Polo

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Economics and Finance; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: September 3, 2019

Abstract

A firm’s ‘reputation’ reflects the expectations of its partners of the benefits of trading with it in the future. An announcement by a regulator that a firm has engaged in misconduct may be expected to impact negatively on trading parties’ (i.e. consumers or investors) expectations for a firm’s future performance, and hence on its market value. How can we identify reputational losses from share price reactions? How large are these losses for different type of misconducts? The chapter seeks to answer the above questions in the light of recent empirical evidence and draws implications for regulatory enforcement policy.

Keywords: reputation; enforcement; event studies

JEL Classification: G18; G38

Suggested Citation

Armour, John and Mayer, Colin and Polo, Andrea, Naming and Shaming: Evidence from Event Studies (September 3, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3447363 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3447363

John Armour

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

St Cross Building
St Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom
+44 1865 281616 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/people/john-armour

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Colin Mayer

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288112 (Phone)
+44 1865 288805 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Andrea Polo (Contact Author)

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Via Kennedy 6
Parma, 43100 - I
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
350
Abstract Views
1,685
Rank
165,995
PlumX Metrics