SEP Royalties: What Theory of Value and Distribution Should Courts Apply

46 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2019 Last revised: 30 Nov 2019

See all articles by Alexander Galetovic

Alexander Galetovic

Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez; Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; University of Padua - CRIEP

Stephen Haber

Stanford University - Hoover Institution and Political Science

Date Written: September 4, 2019

Abstract

We argue that in adjudicating SEP royalty rates, courts should do what they do in pricing other assets or the flows of income they produce: rely on information from the market about the value of comparable assets or their rental rates. The comparables method is based on price theory, which explains where value comes from and how it is distributed among factors of production, including intellectual property. Courts should not employ the “bottom up” or “top down” techniques of royalty apportionment. Both are based on the theory of patent holdup and royalty stacking, which assumes that any observed royalty is the result of “excessive royalties” wrought by the additional monopoly power conferred by standardization. This theory has been shown to be logically inconsistent and logically incomplete, and its predictions have been rejected by systematic empirical tests. As a practical matter, the bottom up technique cannot actually be operationalized. Top down techniques can be operationalized, but employing them requires a court to reject the implications of price theory.

Keywords: Frand, bottom up, top down, price theory

JEL Classification: D42, D46, D33, L63

Suggested Citation

Galetovic, Alexander and Haber, Stephen H., SEP Royalties: What Theory of Value and Distribution Should Courts Apply (September 4, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3447641 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3447641

Alexander Galetovic (Contact Author)

Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez ( email )

Peñalolén
Santiago
Chile

Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States

University of Padua - CRIEP ( email )

Padua
Italy

Stephen H. Haber

Stanford University - Hoover Institution and Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

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