Optimal Labor Contracts, Imperfect Competition and Underemployment Equilibria: a Framework for Analysis

52 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2004 Last revised: 22 Aug 2010

See all articles by Russell Cooper

Russell Cooper

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: October 1986

Abstract

This paper examines the macroeconomic properties of imperfectly competitive economies. The focus is on the coordination failures that might arise in these economies, a study of alternative policies and the comparative static properties of these models. This paper differs from others in this area by modeling the labor market from the perspective of optimal contract theory. This permits an evaluation of the role of labor market behavior in producing these coordination failures and a study of labor market policies (such as unemployment insurance and alternative compensation schemes).

Suggested Citation

Cooper, Russell W., Optimal Labor Contracts, Imperfect Competition and Underemployment Equilibria: a Framework for Analysis (October 1986). NBER Working Paper No. w2060. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=344843

Russell W. Cooper (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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