Informational Benefits of Managerial Myopia

8 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2019

See all articles by Cheng Li

Cheng Li

Mississippi State University

Date Written: September 7, 2019

Abstract

We show that managerial myopia has an informational benefit that has been overlooked in the prior research. A moderately myopic manager incentivizes the advocate of a risky project to produce full information about the project, leading to fully informed decision making and highest firm value.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, managerial objectives, signal informativeness, firm value

JEL Classification: C72, D83, G32

Suggested Citation

Li, Cheng, Informational Benefits of Managerial Myopia (September 7, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3449557 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3449557

Cheng Li (Contact Author)

Mississippi State University ( email )

PO Box 9580
McCool 312
Mississippi State, MS 39762
United States

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