Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders

University of Bern Discussion Paper No. 02.11

18 Pages Posted: 30 Oct 2002

See all articles by Winand Emons

Winand Emons

University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2002

Abstract

First we show that for wealth-constrained agents who may commit an act twice the optimal sanctions are the offender's entire wealth for the first and zero for the second crime. Then we ask the question whether this decreasing sanction scheme is subgame perfect (time consistent), i.e., does a rent-seeking government stick to this sanction scheme after the first crime has occurred. If the benefit and/or the harm from the crime are not too large, this is indeed the case; otherwise, equal sanctions for both crimes are optimal.

Keywords: crime and punishment, repeat offenders, subgame perfection

JEL Classification: D82, K41, K42

Suggested Citation

Emons, Winand, Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders (October 2002). University of Bern Discussion Paper No. 02.11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=345060 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.345060

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University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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