On the Consistency of the European Commission’s Remedies Practice

22 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2019 Last revised: 20 Oct 2019

See all articles by Benjamin Lörtscher

Benjamin Lörtscher

NERA Economic Consulting

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods; NERA Economic Consulting

Date Written: September 9, 2019

Abstract

The European Commission’s remedial practice displays important differences in the type of remedies accepted in merger versus antitrust cases. This paper provides a review of the Commission’s remedies practice over the last 14 years highlighting the differences and discussing inconsistencies. In particular, it raises the question why predominantly behavioural remedies are chosen in antitrust cases and how this practice is in line with the approach in merger control where the risks to effective competition are viewed as deriving from changes in the structure of the market and where therefore structural remedies are typically considered necessary.

Keywords: consistency of remedies, structural remedies, behavioural remedies, Article 7, Article 9, Merger remedies, access remedies, evolution of remedies, remedies practice, European Commission

JEL Classification: K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Lörtscher, Benjamin and Maier-Rigaud, Frank P., On the Consistency of the European Commission’s Remedies Practice (September 9, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3450614 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3450614

Benjamin Lörtscher

NERA Economic Consulting ( email )

50 Main Street, 14th Floor
White Plains, NY 10606
United States

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud (Contact Author)

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods ( email )

Socle de la Grande Arche
1 Parvis de la Défense
Paris, La Défense Cedex, 92044
France

NERA Economic Consulting ( email )

1166 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
United States

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