公共理性与整全义理 (Public Reason and Comprehensive Doctrines)
哲学评论 [Wuda Philosophical Review], Vol. 21 (2018), pp. 57-79
23 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2019
Date Written: July 30, 2014
Chinese Abstract: 审议民主理论家对罗尔斯的公共理性观提出了三层批评：对整全义理的限制不正当地压抑了潜在议程与抗争；公共理性的适用范围过于狭隘；其躲避式的方法有碍于整全义理通过对话交流而转化。本文对此一一回应：只要将罗尔斯对政治观念与整全义理的界分修正为实质性道德观念与整全义理的界分，即可消解第一层担忧；第二层批评误解了文明相待的义务与相互性判准之间的关系；第三层批评基于不可靠的心理学假说，误判了公共理性的实践后果.
English Abstract: This paper amends and defends Rawls’s idea of public reason against three criticisms: that its constraint on comprehensive doctrines does injustice to certain agendas and contestations; that its scope of application is too narrow; and that its method of evasion hinders transformation of comprehensive doctrines through dialogical engagement. In response to the first criticism, I argue that, instead of abandoning Rawls’s distinction between political conceptions and comprehensive doctrines altogether, we could replace it with one that is between substantive moral conceptions and comprehensive doctrines. Meanwhile, the second criticism can be rebutted by clarifying the relationship between the duty of civility, on the one hand, and the criterion of reciprocity, on the other hand, in Rawls’s theory, whereas the third criticism relies on implausible psychological assumptions and misjudges the practical consequences of public reason.
Keywords: Rawls, public reason, comprehensive doctrine, political conception, substantive moral conception, reasonable pluralism, liberal principle of legitimacy, criterion of reciprocity, duty of civility
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