以赛亚·伯林的自由观 (Isaiah Berlin's Conception of Freedom)

法哲学与法社会学论丛 [Archives for Legal Philosophy and Sociology of Law], Vol. 19 (2014), pp. 1-27

28 Pages Posted: 3 Oct 2019

See all articles by Yao Lin

Yao Lin

Yale University, Law School

Date Written: September 23, 2013

Abstract

Chinese Abstract: 本文为伯林的自由观略加澄清与辩护。在前两节中,我首先说明伯林并非许多人眼中的“消极自由的鼓吹者”,并将这种误解的源头追溯到伯林的文本含混与理论张力之中;后三节则展开重构伯林自由观背后的价值多元论框架,尽力勾勒出最有望用以化解前述理论张力的资源与策略,以便为未来进一步的探讨与反思奠定基础。

English Abstract: This paper clarifies and defends Isaiah Berlin's conception of freedom. The first two sections argue against the common perception of Berlin as an "advocate for negative liberty", and trace the origins of this misconception to the textual ambiguities and theoretical tensions within Berlin's own work. The next three sections reconstruct the value-pluralist framework underlying Berlin's conception of freedom, and explore the various resources and strategies within this framework that could help solve the aforementioned theoretical tensions.

Suggested Citation

Lin, Yao, 以赛亚·伯林的自由观 (Isaiah Berlin's Conception of Freedom) (September 23, 2013). 法哲学与法社会学论丛 [Archives for Legal Philosophy and Sociology of Law], Vol. 19 (2014), pp. 1-27, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3452184

Yao Lin (Contact Author)

Yale University, Law School ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

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