Do Directors’ Mobility Restrictions Matter? An International Evidence

33 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2019 Last revised: 3 Jun 2020

See all articles by Chrysovalantis Vasilakis

Chrysovalantis Vasilakis

Bangor Business School; Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; University of Aegean

Date Written: September 11, 2019

Abstract

From business to politics and academia, the economic effects of restrictions of high-skilled migration are under scrutiny. We examine and quantify the effects of the restrictions on corporate directors’ mobility on the firm market value. Using two unexpected events – the outcome of the EU referendum in the UK and the election of Donald Trump as the US President and his decisions to restrict the entrance of nationals of several majority Muslim countries to the USA - we find that restricting international mobility of high-skilled workers has a negative impact on the firm value, measured as the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). This result remains robust under alternative specifications and placebo tests. Moreover, we show that the firms that have foreign directors on boards that do not face additional mobility restrictions experience an increase in value around the aforementioned events, suggesting the transfer of usefulness between the two categories of foreign directors.

Keywords: International mobility, restriction, Directors, Event studies

JEL Classification: F22, J61, G34, G32, M41

Suggested Citation

Vasilakis, Chrysovalantis, Do Directors’ Mobility Restrictions Matter? An International Evidence (September 11, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3452251 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3452251

Chrysovalantis Vasilakis (Contact Author)

Bangor Business School ( email )

Bangor Business School
College Road
Gwynedd LL57 2DG, Wales LL57 2DG
United Kingdom

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
B1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

University of Aegean ( email )

Chios, 82131
Greece

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