Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms

59 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2019 Last revised: 20 Jul 2020

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 20, 2020

Abstract

This article analyzes how the selling mechanisms used by a data intermediary impact the optimal information structure sold to competing firms. We analyze how take it or leave it offers, sequential bargaining, and auctions, change the bargaining power between the data intermediary and competing firms, impacting the price of information, and the amount of data collected on the market for information. We highlight conflicting interests between data intermediaries, data protection agencies and competition authorities, and we discuss regulatory implications.

Keywords: Consumer information; Price discrimination, Regulation

Suggested Citation

Bounie, David and Dubus, Antoine and Waelbroeck, Patrick, Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms (July 20, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3454193 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3454193

David Bounie

Télécom Paris ( email )

19 Place Marguerite Perey
Palaiseau, 91120
France

Antoine Dubus (Contact Author)

Télécom Paris ( email )

19 Place Marguerite Perey
Palaiseau, 91120
France

Patrick Waelbroeck

Télécom Paris ( email )

19 Place Marguerite Perey
Palaiseau, 91120
France

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