The Core of a Transferable Utility Game as the Solution to a Public Good Market Demand Problem

16 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2019 Last revised: 28 Dec 2019

See all articles by Paul H. Edelman

Paul H. Edelman

Vanderbilt University - Law School

Martin Van der Linden

Emory University

John A. Weymark

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 17, 2019

Abstract

The core of a monotonic transferable utility (TU) game is shown to be the set of prices that incentivize each individual to demand the grand coalition in a market demand problem in which the goods being demanded are coalitions viewed as public goods. It is also shown that the core is the intersection of superdifferentials evaluated at the grand coalition of the covers of person-specific TU games derived from the original game. These characterizations of the core demonstrate how a market demand approach to the core in the spirit of Baldwin and Klemperer is related to the approach to the core using the cover of a TU game and it superdifferential at the grand coalition developed by Shapley and Shubik, Aubin, and Danilov and Koshevoy.

Keywords: TU games; the core; superdifferentials; market demand; public goods

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Paul H. and Van der Linden, Martin and Weymark, John A., The Core of a Transferable Utility Game as the Solution to a Public Good Market Demand Problem (September 17, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3454948 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3454948

Paul H. Edelman

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

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Martin Van der Linden

Emory University ( email )

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United States

John A. Weymark (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

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Nashville, TN 37235
United States
1-615-322-1437 (Phone)
1-615-343-8495 (Fax)

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