Approval Voting and Shapley Ranking

CORE Discussion Paper 2018-12

20 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2019

See all articles by Pierre Dehez

Pierre Dehez

University of Louvain

Victor Ginsburgh

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Date Written: April 15, 2018

Abstract

Approval voting allows voters to list any number of candidates. Their scores are obtained by summing the votes cast in their favor. Fractional voting instead follows the One-person-one-vote principle by endowing voters with a single vote that they may freely distribute among candidates. In this paper, we show that fairness requires the distribution of votes to be uniform. Uniform fractional voting corresponds to Shapley ranking that was introduced to rank wines as the Shapley value of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Here we analyze the properties of these "ranking games" and provide an axiomatic foundation to Shapley ranking. We also analyze Shapley ranking as a social welfare function and compare it to approval ranking.

Keywords: approval voting, Shapley va

JEL Classification: D71, C71

Suggested Citation

Dehez, Pierre and Ginsburgh, Victor, Approval Voting and Shapley Ranking (April 15, 2018). CORE Discussion Paper 2018-12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3455141 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3455141

Pierre Dehez (Contact Author)

University of Louvain ( email )

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Victor Ginsburgh

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

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Brussels, B-1050
Belgium

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