Guidance on Strategic Information: Investor-Management Disagreement and Firm Intrinsic Value

57 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2019

See all articles by Anna Agapova

Anna Agapova

Florida Atlantic University

Nikanor Volkov

Mercer University

Date Written: September 3, 2019


We investigate the decision by corporate management to voluntarily disclose information that pertains to a firm’s strategy. We find the likelihood of disclosure to be a tradeoff between the benefit of reducing information asymmetry and the cost of investors disagreeing with the strategy; this cost varies with the firm’s intrinsic value. Higher levels of investor-management disagreement and of information asymmetry increase the likelihood that managers will disclose strategic information; those at firms with higher intrinsic value, however, are less likely to do so. Our results vary in statistical significance across different proxy specifications, but hold qualitatively. They are robust to the use of exogenous shocks to investor-management disagreement and information asymmetry. The evidence supports a causal link between investor-management disagreement and strategic disclosure.

Keywords: irm strategy; disclosure of strategic information; information asymmetry; investor-management disagreement; firm value; raise of capital

JEL Classification: G30, G32, M41

Suggested Citation

Agapova, Anna and Volkov, Nikanor, Guidance on Strategic Information: Investor-Management Disagreement and Firm Intrinsic Value (September 3, 2019). Journal of Banking and Finance, Forthcoming DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.105632, Available at SSRN:

Anna Agapova (Contact Author)

Florida Atlantic University ( email )

Finance Department
777 Glades Rd
Boca Raton, FL 33431
United States
561-297-3493 (Phone)

Nikanor Volkov

Mercer University ( email )

1400 Coleman Avenue
Atlanta, GA 30341-4155
United States

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