Immigration and Voting on the Size and the Composition of Public Spending

FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis, 69/2, 135-147, 2013

Posted: 27 Sep 2019

See all articles by Karin Mayr-Dorn

Karin Mayr-Dorn

Johannes Kepler University of Linz

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of immigration by skill on the outcome of a majority vote among natives on both the size and the composition of public spending. Public spending can be of two types, spending on rival goods (transfers) and on nonrival goods (public goods). I find that the effect of immigration on total public spending depends both on the degree of income inequality and on preferences for the different types of spending. In particular, both skilled and unskilled immigrants are more likely to increase (decrease) the size of total public spending if natives have a preference for spending on public goods (spending on transfers).

Keywords: immigration, voting, transfers, public goods

JEL Classification: F2, H4, H5

Suggested Citation

Mayr-Dorn, Karin, Immigration and Voting on the Size and the Composition of Public Spending (2013). FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis, 69/2, 135-147, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3455886

Karin Mayr-Dorn (Contact Author)

Johannes Kepler University of Linz ( email )

Altenbergerstrasse 69
Linz, Upper Austria 4040
Austria

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