Smart Contracts: Reducing Risks in Economic Exchange with No-Party Trust?

European Journal of Risk Regulation, Volume 10, Issue 2 (Symposium on Blockchain Regulation and Governance) June 2019, pp. 245-262, DOI/10.1017/err.2019.37

19 Pages Posted: 1 Oct 2019

See all articles by Helen Eenmaa-Dimitrieva

Helen Eenmaa-Dimitrieva

University of Tartu School of Law

Maria José Schmidt-Kessen

Copenhagen Business School - CBS Law

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

Our study on smart contracts, self-executing agreements based on blockchain technology, can be placed in the field of inquiry within law and economics of contracts which explores new modes of contract enforcement as sources of market creation. We lay the foundations by characterising contract enforcement and trust mechanisms underlying contracts. Considering that trust reduces risks in economic exchange, we explain how the particular trust mechanism underlying smart contracts’ enforcement (no-party trust) provides opportunities for creating new markets and changing existing ones. We explore, among other things, whether using smart contracts could be a path to increasing the autonomy of consumers and offering a solution for democratising trade.

Keywords: law and economics, markets, contract law, smart contracts, trust, no-trust environment, enforcement, relational contracts

Suggested Citation

Eenmaa-Dimitrieva, Helen and Schmidt-Kessen, Maria José, Smart Contracts: Reducing Risks in Economic Exchange with No-Party Trust? (2019). European Journal of Risk Regulation, Volume 10, Issue 2 (Symposium on Blockchain Regulation and Governance) June 2019, pp. 245-262, DOI/10.1017/err.2019.37, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3455962

Helen Eenmaa-Dimitrieva (Contact Author)

University of Tartu School of Law ( email )

Näituse 20
Tartu, 50409
Estonia

Maria José Schmidt-Kessen

Copenhagen Business School - CBS Law ( email )

Porcelaenshave 18B, 1
Frederiksberg 2000
Denmark

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
129
Abstract Views
499
rank
240,642
PlumX Metrics