The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility

6 Pages Posted: 9 Oct 2019

See all articles by San Diego Legal Studies RPS Submitter

San Diego Legal Studies RPS Submitter

University of San Diego School of Law

Larry Alexander

University of San Diego School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

In this paper I argue that even if the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is satisfied, moral responsibility is more seriously threatened if the Principle of Alternative Possible Reasons (PAPR) is not satisfied. Nor, I argue, is it clear how it could be satisfied. Finally, I suggest that not only moral responsibility, but also normativity itself, is threatened by the failure to satisfy PAPR.

Keywords: Libertarian, Moral responsibility, Normativity, Reasons

JEL Classification: K00, K10

Suggested Citation

RPS Submitter, San Diego Legal Studies and Alexander, Lawrence, The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility (2019). San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 19-416. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456151 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456151

San Diego Legal Studies RPS Submitter

University of San Diego School of Law ( email )

5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110

Lawrence Alexander (Contact Author)

University of San Diego School of Law ( email )

5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States
619-260-2317 (Phone)
619-260-4728 (Fax)

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