Foretelling What Makes People Pay: Predicting the Results of Field Experiments on TV Fee Enforcement

18 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2019 Last revised: 11 Nov 2021

See all articles by Katerina Chadimova

Katerina Chadimova

Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, Students

Jana Cahlikova

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute)

Lubomir Cingl

University of Economics, Prague

Date Written: September 19, 2019

Abstract

A common challenge in field experimentation is designing effective treatment interventions. Therefore, any advance information about the expected effectiveness of planned treatments is highly valuable to identify the most promising interventions and inform power calculations. We run a laboratory experiment in which non-experts forecast results of two large field experiments focused on TV license fee collection to evaluate whether it is possible to predict their results. In our setting, forecasters identified the most effective treatments targeted at deterrence motive but struggled to forecast “soft” behavioral treatments compared to baseline. However, they were mostly correct when forecasting their same effectiveness in comparison with each other. Our results suggest that despite the artificiality of the laboratory environment, forecasts generated there may, to some extent, provide valuable estimates of treatment effectiveness. Importantly, surprising differences between predictions and field results might help identifying candidates for replication studies.

Keywords: lab experiments, forecasting experimental results, field experiments, behavioral economics

JEL Classification: C91, C92, C93, D03

Suggested Citation

Chadimova, Katerina and Cahlikova, Jana and Cingl, Lubomir, Foretelling What Makes People Pay: Predicting the Results of Field Experiments on TV Fee Enforcement (September 19, 2019). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2019-15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456513 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456513

Katerina Chadimova

Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, Students ( email )

Opletalova 26
Praha 1
Czech Republic

Jana Cahlikova (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.janacahlikova.net

Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) ( email )

P.O. Box 882
7 Politickych veznu
Prague 1, 111 21
Czech Republic

Lubomir Cingl

University of Economics, Prague ( email )

nam. W.Churchilla 4
Prague 3, 130 67
Czech Republic

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