Foretelling What Makes People Pay: Predicting the Results of Field Experiments on TV Fee Enforcement

27 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2019

See all articles by Katerina Chadimova

Katerina Chadimova

Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, Students

Jana Cahlikova

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute)

Lubomir Cingl

University of Economics, Prague

Date Written: September 19, 2019

Abstract

One of the current challenges in field experimentation is creating an efficient design including individual treatments. Ideally, a pilot should be run in advance, but when a pilot is not feasible, any information about the effectiveness of potential treatments' to researchers is highly valuable. We run a laboratory experiment in which we forecast results of two large-scale field experiments focused on TV license fee collection to evaluate the extent to which it is possible to predict field experiment results using a non-expert subject pool. Our main result is that forecasters were relatively conservative regarding the absolute effectiveness of the treatments, but in most cases they correctly predicted the relative effectiveness. Our results suggest that, despite the artificiality of laboratory environments, forecasts generated there may provide valuable estimates of the effectiveness of treatments.

Keywords: lab experiments, forecasting experimental results, field experiments, behavioral economics

JEL Classification: C91, C92, C93, D03

Suggested Citation

Chadimova, Katerina and Cahlikova, Jana and Cingl, Lubomir, Foretelling What Makes People Pay: Predicting the Results of Field Experiments on TV Fee Enforcement (September 19, 2019). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2019-15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456513 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456513

Katerina Chadimova

Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, Students ( email )

Opletalova 26
Praha 1
Czech Republic

Jana Cahlikova (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.janacahlikova.net

Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) ( email )

P.O. Box 882
7 Politickych veznu
Prague 1, 111 21
Czech Republic

Lubomir Cingl

University of Economics, Prague ( email )

nam. W.Churchilla 4
Prague 3, 130 67
Czech Republic

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