Download This PaperPeer Review Can Fix Collective Action Problems… Let’s Bake It First and Then Divide It!
1 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2019 Last revised: 8 Oct 2019
Date Written: September 19, 2019
Abstract
We present a model where players first decide whether to contribute or not, and then divide the worth that was created via – in particular – the mechanism proposed by de Clippel et al. We compare the incentives to contribute in this scenario with those under equal splitting, and thus illustrate that the social dilemma may be overcome in this way.
Keywords: peer review, collective action
JEL Classification: C79
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Nax, Heinrich H., Peer Review Can Fix Collective Action Problems… Let’s Bake It First and Then Divide It! (September 19, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456665 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456665
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