Peer Review Can Fix Collective Action Problems… Let’s Bake It First and Then Divide It!

1 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2019 Last revised: 8 Oct 2019

See all articles by Heinrich H. Nax

Heinrich H. Nax

ETH Zurich; University of Zurich

Date Written: September 19, 2019

Abstract

We present a model where players first decide whether to contribute or not, and then divide the worth that was created via – in particular – the mechanism proposed by de Clippel et al. We compare the incentives to contribute in this scenario with those under equal splitting, and thus illustrate that the social dilemma may be overcome in this way.

Keywords: peer review, collective action

JEL Classification: C79

Suggested Citation

Nax, Heinrich H., Peer Review Can Fix Collective Action Problems… Let’s Bake It First and Then Divide It! (September 19, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456665 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456665

Heinrich H. Nax (Contact Author)

ETH Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 101
ZUE F7
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

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