Delaying Informed Consent: An Empirical Investigation of Mobile Apps' Upgrade Decisions

75 Pages Posted: 2 Oct 2019 Last revised: 19 Mar 2021

See all articles by Raveesh Mayya

Raveesh Mayya

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Siva Viswanathan

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business

Date Written: March 14, 2021

Abstract

We study apps' decisions to upgrade to Android 6.0, which restricts their ability to seek blanket permissions to sensitive user information at install-time, instead requiring them to request à la carte permissions at runtime. Such a shift in Android’s permission seeking policy comes in the wake of apps’ overreaching and users’ proactive measures to protect their sensitive information. Mobile apps on Android had a choice of upgrading to target Android 6.0 anytime over a three-year window instead of being forced to upgrade immediately. Given the choice of upgrading to version 6.0, that provides mobile apps with the latest platform features or staying with an earlier version that provides them with better access to user information, our study seeks to examine the upgrade decisions of apps and the outcomes of such decisions. By analyzing a unique panel dataset comprising 13,691 of the most popular apps for 24 months, we find that apps that traditionally seek more runtime permissions than those required for the app’s functionality, strategically delay upgrading. Specifically, we find that such upgrade delays are more likely by overreaching apps that seek to serve targeted advertisements in-app. More importantly, we find that such strategic delaying of upgrade comes at a cost to apps in terms of marketplace outcomes such as rating and popularity. We discuss the implications of our findings for app providers as well as platform operators.

Keywords: Information Privacy, Mobile Apps, Software Upgrade, Platform Governance

Suggested Citation

Mayya, Raveesh and Viswanathan, Siva, Delaying Informed Consent: An Empirical Investigation of Mobile Apps' Upgrade Decisions (March 14, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3457018 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3457018

Raveesh Mayya (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

Siva Viswanathan

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business ( email )

College Park, MD 20742-1815
United States

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