Family Ownership and Antitrust Violations

49 Pages Posted: 2 Oct 2019 Last revised: 30 Jun 2021

See all articles by Mario Daniele Amore

Mario Daniele Amore

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology

Riccardo Marzano

Sapienza University of Rome

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 21, 2019

Abstract

We study the relationship between corporate ownership and anticompetitive actions. Using data from Italy, we find that family firms are significantly less likely than other firms to be involved in antitrust indictments. This result holds controlling for several factors which are different across family and nonfamily firms and may, in turn, correlate with anticompetitive behavior. Family control reduces the likelihood of antitrust indictments especially among larger companies, which are generally more likely to be prosecuted. However, conditional on being prosecuted, family firms face the same likelihood of monetary sanctions than nonfamily firms. Collectively, our results provide new insights on the role of corporate ownership for firms’ anticompetitive behavior.

Keywords: antitrust violation; corporate ownership; investment; financing

JEL Classification: D22; K21; G34; G38

Suggested Citation

Amore, Mario Daniele and Marzano, Riccardo, Family Ownership and Antitrust Violations (September 21, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3457794 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3457794

Mario Daniele Amore (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Riccardo Marzano

Sapienza University of Rome ( email )

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