Empirical Models of Lobbying

41 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2019 Last revised: 28 Oct 2024

See all articles by Matilde Bombardini

Matilde Bombardini

University of British Columbia (UBC)

Francesco Trebbi

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: September 2019

Abstract

This paper offers a review of the recent empirical literature on lobbying within Political Economy. In surveying extant evidence, we emphasize quid-pro-quo and informational issues in special interest politics and we highlight crucial open research questions in both. The main unresolved methodological issues remain how to properly account for the impact of lobbying on which equilibrium policies are chosen and advanced, and on how distorted those equilibrium policies might be relative to the interests of the general public. Of the principal open questions within political economy, a comprehensive quantitative assessment of the welfare distortions of lobbying remains one of the most elusive

Suggested Citation

Bombardini, Matilde and Trebbi, Francesco, Empirical Models of Lobbying (September 2019). NBER Working Paper No. w26287, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3458214

Matilde Bombardini (Contact Author)

University of British Columbia (UBC) ( email )

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Francesco Trebbi

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

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2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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