Empirical Models of Lobbying
41 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2019 Last revised: 28 Oct 2024
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Empirical Models of Lobbying
Empirical Models of Lobbying
Date Written: September 2019
Abstract
This paper offers a review of the recent empirical literature on lobbying within Political Economy. In surveying extant evidence, we emphasize quid-pro-quo and informational issues in special interest politics and we highlight crucial open research questions in both. The main unresolved methodological issues remain how to properly account for the impact of lobbying on which equilibrium policies are chosen and advanced, and on how distorted those equilibrium policies might be relative to the interests of the general public. Of the principal open questions within political economy, a comprehensive quantitative assessment of the welfare distortions of lobbying remains one of the most elusive
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