Close Cooperation within the SRM: Centralised Decision-Making, Decentralised Implementation – Shared Responsibilities
21 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2019
Date Written: September 23, 2019
At first sight, the very concept as well as the modus operandi of close cooperation between the SRM and non-euro Member States are closely realigned with the application of the concept within the SSM. In fact, pursuant to Art. 4(1) SRMR, the establishment of close cooperation cannot be agreed separately, but follows automatically from the decision of non-euro Member States to join the SSM. Likewise, by virtue of Art. 4(2) SRMR, suspension or termination of close cooperation within the SRM is triggered by the termi-nation of the arrangements under Art. 7 SSMR, but cannot be agreed independently from the decision whether or not to end close cooperation within the SSM. In some respects, especially in terms of institutional features (including the representation of national interests within the relevant institutions) and within the context of recovery and resolution planning, close cooperation is likely to encounter challenges and problems similar to those to be expected within the SSM. At the same time, however, given residual differ-ences in terms of governance structure as well as the substantive and procedural framework for the opera-tion of the respective regimes, the implementation of the concept within the SRM will meet fundamentally different problems. Only one of these problems, i.e. the recoupment of contributions to the SRF following the termination of close cooperation, has been addressed explicitly in the SRMR (Art. 4(3) SRMR). Against this backdrop, the paper examines potential challenges to the establishment and operation of close coop-eration in the SRM in the light of fundamental structural differences between the SSM and the SRM.
Keywords: Banking Union, SSM, SRM, close cooperation, bank resolution
JEL Classification: E44, G20, G21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation