Delinking Investment in Antibiotic Research and Development from Sales Revenues: The Challenges of Transforming a Promising Idea into Reality

10 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2021

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1, 2016

Abstract

A number of different proposals and research and development (R&D) models for stimulating antibiotic innovation have been proposed, each differing with respect to characteristics such as the type and timing of innovation incentives and the degree of governmental public control of the market. For antibiotics, business models based on sales volumes tend to promote overuse and thereby resistance. Here we build on a recently published Chatham House report focused on how policymakers could move forward in designing delinked mechanisms separating the return on investment in R&D from antibiotic sales volume and revenues. We describe three key issues, access, conservation, and innovation, and address how they could work within a delinked model for developing future antibiotics.

Note: Funding Statement: No specific funding supported the work.

Declaration of Interests: AS's work on antibiotic resistance is supported both by a Swedish Sida grant for ReAct—Action on Antibiotic Resistance and as a recipient of the Robert Wood Johnson Investigator Award in Health Policy Research. CC is Chair of the Governing Board of the Medicines Patent Pool. The remaining authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Keywords: antibiotics,antibiotic innovation,research and development,

JEL Classification: I15,I18,I19

Suggested Citation

Outterson, Kevin, Delinking Investment in Antibiotic Research and Development from Sales Revenues: The Challenges of Transforming a Promising Idea into Reality (June 1, 2016). Boston Univ. School of Law Research Paper Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3458529 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3458529

Kevin Outterson (Contact Author)

Boston University School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
8
Abstract Views
177
PlumX Metrics