Deterrence of Orchestrated Cheating: Group versus Individual Punishment

41 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2019

See all articles by Shmuel Leshem

Shmuel Leshem

Independent

Abraham L. Wickelgren

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law; University of Texas at Austin - Center for Law, Business, and Economics

Date Written: September 24, 2019

Abstract

In the wake of a state-sponsored doping scandal, the World Anti-Doping Agency reommended banning all Russian athletes from the Rio Olympic Games. We study the circumstances in which such group penalties deter a group leader, whose payoff is tied to the group's benefits and sanctions, from helping cheating group members avoid detection. We show that relative to individual punishment, group punishment deters orchestrated cheating and thereby increases individual deterrence for su¢ ciently strong enforcement and a bounded detection-avoidance technology. Otherwise, group punishment fosters individual cheating. Group punishment is thus a double-edged sword useful primarily as an off-equilibrium threat against orchestrated cheating but detrimental if frequently imposed on the equilibrium path.

Keywords: collective punishment, individual punishment

JEL Classification: K72, K1

Suggested Citation

Leshem, Shmuel and Wickelgren, Abraham L., Deterrence of Orchestrated Cheating: Group versus Individual Punishment (September 24, 2019). U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3459036 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3459036

Shmuel Leshem

Independent ( email )

Los Angeles, CA

Abraham L. Wickelgren (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )

727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States

University of Texas at Austin - Center for Law, Business, and Economics

Austin, TX 78712
United States

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