Inefficiencies in Digital Advertising Markets

Journal of Marketing, Forthcoming

Posted: 30 Sep 2019 Last revised: 23 Feb 2020

See all articles by Brett R. Gordon

Brett R. Gordon

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Kinshuk Jerath

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Zsolt Katona

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Sridhar Narayanan

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Jiwoong Shin

Yale School of Management

Kenneth C. Wilbur

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Date Written: February 18, 2020

Abstract

Digital advertising markets are growing and attracting increased scrutiny. This paper explores four market inefficiencies that remain poorly understood: ad effect measurement, frictions between and within advertising channel members, ad blocking and ad fraud. These topics are not unique to digital advertising, but each manifests in new ways in markets for digital ads. We identify relevant findings in the academic literature, recent developments in practice, and promising topics for future research.

Keywords: Advertising, Antitrust, Digitalization, Inefficiencies, Markets

JEL Classification: M30, M31, M37, M38, L4, L5, L52, L86, K20, D86

Suggested Citation

Gordon, Brett R. and Jerath, Kinshuk and Katona, Zsolt and Narayanan, Sridhar and Shin, Jiwoong and Wilbur, Kenneth C., Inefficiencies in Digital Advertising Markets (February 18, 2020). Journal of Marketing, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3459199 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3459199

Brett R. Gordon

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2211 Campus Drive
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Kinshuk Jerath

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Zsolt Katona

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Sridhar Narayanan

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-9675 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/facultybios/bio.asp?ID=409

Jiwoong Shin

Yale School of Management ( email )

165 Whitney Avenue
PO Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520
United States
2034326665 (Phone)
06520 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.som.yale.edu/JiwoongShin/

Kenneth C. Wilbur (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States

HOME PAGE: http://kennethcwilbur.com

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